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Abstract 
 
In this paper I examine some of the implications, possibilities, and dangers of 
addressing the experience of ‘madness’ or ‘mental illness’1 within 
autobiographical narrative: in particular, I ask how madness can be narrated, or 
spoken. I suggest that an attentive reading of narrative form, as the outworking 
and evidence of a way of knowing and thinking about the world, may reveal 
authorial attempts to manage and stretch the constraints inherent in 
conventional narrative’s tendency toward linearity and resolution, a tendency 
which is, arguably, inimical to the expression of madness. Insinuated in this 
process of working with form is a particular narrative mode of existence which 
has implications for the psychodynamics of living with mental distress. With 
reference to the work of Sarah Kofman, I propose the idea that a ‘writing 
without power’ may be a salutary way to address chronic distress, and to 
reformulate identity in the light of biographical disruption. 
 
 
Speaking of Madness 
 
Fundamental difficulties present themselves to the autobiographer recording a 
descent into madness. Traditional narrative form, in which raw events are re-
codified into a coherent plot, and also language’s inherent quality of producing 
meaning via order and sequence, may be inimical to the expression of what 
Julia Kristeva, writing of melancholia, has called the “excess of an unorderable 
cognitive chaos” (Kristeva, 1989: 33). Many autopathographers2 have 
addressed this difficulty. For instance, in 1903 Daniel Schreber wrote of his 
psychotic experience: “I cannot of course count upon being fully understood 
because things are dealt with that cannot be expressed in human language; they 
exceed human understanding […] To make myself […] comprehensible I shall 
have to speak much in images and similes” (Schreber, 1955: 41). More recent 
memoirists who have expressed similar sentiments include Ross Burke: “The 
truth cannot be expressed. It is the land of the id” (Burke, 1995: 193); Andrew 
Solomon, who insists depression “can be described only in metaphor and 
allegory” (Solomon, 2002: 16); Lauren Slater, who writes of the “subtleties and 
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horrors and gaps in my past for which I have never been able to find the 
words” (Slater, 2000: 219-20); and William Styron, who speaks of a “horror”, 
“so overwhelming as to be quite beyond expression” (Styron, 1990: 83). 
 Such sentiments call to mind arguments emerging from ‘trauma theory’, 
that body of work which, amongst other things, addresses the epistemological 
implications of traumatic experience and its representation: in particular, they 
evoke the supposedly unspeakable nature of trauma. This aporetic state is 
engendered by (at least) two factors. Firstly, because severe shock is not fully 
cognitively processed, it is both known (in the body, and occurring as 
nightmares, symptoms and flashbacks), and simultaneously unknown - because 
unavailable to the ordinary mechanisms of memory and narrative (see Freud, 
1991; Felman and Laub, 1992; Caruth, 1996 and 1995; Herman, 1994). 
Secondly, and more prosaically, the problematic of the unspeakable arises in 
the question of whether it is possible to fit the limit-experience of shock, 
psychical chaos, crisis, or acute suffering into a narrative, when such 
experiences are in themselves profoundly anti-narrational in character. 
Moreover, if we do narrate the limit-experience, won’t this narration transform 
trauma into something which it was, and is, not - something governed by order, 
sense, reason and progression? And would not such a narrative be a false story, 
a story which is dissonant with the self’s distress? 
 In the case of madness, these questions come into particularly sharp relief. 
It is, arguably, an a priori proposition that to faithfully describe or express the 
manifestations of madness within a discourse governed by reason will be an 
undertaking, which, at the least, is fraught with difficulty. Madness is, after all, 
defined by its difference from reason, and also, to some extent at least, by its 
variance from the readable forms of narrative; it is, and I am obviously 
generalizing here, characterized by, variously, fragmentation, amorphousness, 
entropy, chaos, silence, senselessness. In that light, then, is narrative 
representation intrinsically inimical to its expression? I’m reminded here of 
Jacques Derrida’s observation, in an essay which addresses the verbal 
expression of madness, that, “By its essence, the sentence is normal. It carries 
normality within it […]”; “discourse”, he goes on, is a “nothing that neutralises 
everything” (Derrida, 1978: 54-5). 
 There may also be a further difficulty for the autopathographer. If madness 
is a condition centring on and evoked within various aspects of cognition, then 
an autopathography will involve a re-negotiating of the spaces of the self in 
which suffering is, or was, experienced; that is to say, to formulate a narrative 
will necessitate a willed passage into and through the same spaces of the self - 
thought, memory and emotion - in which illness has been, and possibly still is, 
manifest. The narrative journey, therefore, may be a perilous one; and this in 
turn insinuates that the form of narrative might map more than a discrete 
history, but rather may dramatize the very echoes and reverberations of 
distress. 
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 This is, I suggest, the case with Elizabeth’s Wurtzel’s well-known memoir 
of depression, Prozac Nation (Wurtzel, 1999). For, just as the narrator of 
Dante’s Inferno laments that narration is itself a perilous enterprise - “To tell/ 
about those woods is hard - so tangled and rough/ And savage that thinking of 
it now, I feel/ the old fear stirring: death is hardly more bitter” (Dante, 1997: 
Canto I) - so Wurtzel as narrator frequently appears imperilled by the material 
she relates. Indeed narrative form often seems to dramatize or perform the 
experiences Wurtzel describes. For instance, the ambiguous and confusing 
chronotopes3 of her novelistic text strikingly parallel her description of the way 
in which a balanced sense of past, present, and future are painfully disrupted in 
her depression. So, passages narrated in the preterite (or simple past) are 
continually disturbed by the incursion of the present tense, as if the act of 
remembering has awoken slumbering horrors which invade the moment of 
writing. As if attempting to explain this narratological and psychological 
dynamic, at one moment in the text when describing a nervous collapse, 
Wurtzel writes of the act of remembering as an invasive counterpart of 
breakdown: 
 
I am collapsing and I am collapsing on myself. I am shards of glass, and I am the 
person being wounded by the glass. I am killing myself. I am remembering when 
my father disappeared. I am remembering when Zachary and I broke up in ninth 
grade. I am remembering being a little child and crying when my mother left me at 
nursery school. I am crying so hard, gasping for breath, I am incoherent and I 
know it.  (Wurtzel, 1999: 101-2) 
 
 The cry here of “I am remembering”, evoking as it does both the 
protagonist’s experience of memory as invasion, but also, inevitably, the 
remembering consciousness of the narrator/writer, leaves the reader uncertain 
who is remembering, who is incoherent: is it Wurtzel-as-protagonist, Wurtzel-
as-narrator, or both? Is this an event which has happened, or is it still 
happening at the moment of writing? 
 Another text which evokes the sense of a narrative self caught up in the 
events it relates is Tracy Thompson’s The Beast: A Journey Through 
Depression (Thompson, 1996). For, despite an ostensibly assured narrative 
voice, Thompson tells her story, particularly the story of an abusive 
relationship, with very few narrative overviews. Relating her involvement with 
a man who at first appears kind, but is soon revealed as a manipulating bully 
intent on convincing her that she is responsible for bringing her suffering onto 
herself, narration, as in Prozac Nation, proceeds as if the events are still 
happening, and as if Thompson is unaware of the story’s outcome. Because of 
this the reader may feel temporarily unsure whether Thompson-narrator has 
managed to extricate herself from the destructive mindset in which Thompson-
protagonist blamed herself for the abuse; indeed, reading The Beast can feel at 
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times like attending to the groundless self-blame of a frightened, bullied 
woman. 
 While both Thompson and Wurtzel do actually provide narrative 
overviews - in the form of Epilogues, Afterwords and Introductions, as well as 
occasional prolepses and analepses - their narrative descents imply not only the 
problematization of narrative as a detached vehicle for an objective life-history, 
but also, I suggest, evoke a kind of speaking, or narration. In each text the 
narrating self refuses to separate itself off from its ‘history’, and resists a strict 
demarcation of discrete regions of health and illness, instead allowing the 
unsettling refluxes of distress and uncertainty to imbricate its telling. In sum, 
whether entirely willed or not, the narrative stances adopted are predicated on 
an openness to the unforeseen, and most importantly do not attempt to shut out 
these emergent and anarchic energies; they are each, to use Peter Brooks’s 
formula as he describes the narrative dynamics at work in Freud’s case history 
of the ‘Wolf Man’, restagings of a “complex and buried past history […] as it 
covertly reconstitutes itself in the present language” (Brooks, 1992: 283). 
 All this brings me back to the first of the difficulties I spoke of earlier: the 
issue of whether it is possible to speak of madness in such a way that does not 
do violence to the speaker and their experience. The French philosopher Sarah 
Kofman imagined (and demonstrated) just such a way of speaking in her book 
Smothered Words, a meditation on the effects of the Holocaust on discourse 
(Kofman, 1998; see also Kofman, 1995); she named this discursive mode 
ecrire sans pouvoir - ‘writing without power’. In much of her work Kofman 
was concerned to highlight and challenge the way that traditional forms of 
narrative in their dependence on retrospective closure, linearity, unity, and 
coherence repress the possibility of multiplicity and otherness. She searched 
for, as Vivian Liska puts it, “a mode of thinking and writing capable of 
undoing the repressive authority and exclusionary mastery in a philosophical 
tradition that pretends to have conclusive truths, to own the ‘last word’” (Liska, 
2000: 91). Kofman herself put it like this: 
 
To speak: it is necessary - without the power: without allowing language, too 
powerful, sovereign, to master the aporetic situation, absolute powerlessness and 
very distress, to enclose it in the clarity and happiness of daylight. 
  (Kofman, 1998: 10) 
 
 Note the two imperatives in Kofman’s dictum: first to speak; and second, 
to speak without power. Such a speaking, she says, does not attempt to master 
the traumatic event - does not attempt to make that which is aporetic - 
intrinsically full of doubt - into something that can be fully known and 
understood. Instead it represents, as Kofman’s translator Madeleine Dobie 
explains it, an “attempt to give voice to a language beyond the authority of an 
author”; and is a “writing without being able to write […] the impossible 
writing which is not of the order of intentionality and power” (in Kofman, 
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1998: xiv). Importantly, for Kofman the converse of this impossible writing - 
narratives defined by their self-sufficiency, their movement towards closure 
and coherence, their inherent drive for mastery over the chaos and 
incomprehensibility of events - reproduces the dynamic which led to the 
Holocaust, and which W. G. Sebald, in his novel Austerlitz, called a “mania for 
order and purity” (Sebald, 2002: 278). So Kofman links the desire for 
philosophical - and narrative - mastery to a desire to exterminate that which is 
other - to destroy the unknown, and to delimit the infinite. 
 A writing without power is perhaps particularly relevant in the context of 
the representation of mental distress. And significantly this particular sort of 
knowing and representation stands in stark contrast to the world-view 
implicitly underpinning a purely biomedical stance on madness; indeed, one 
might characterize the biomedical position as precisely an attempt to enclose 
the intrinsically aporetic in the clarity and happiness of (a scientistic, 
diagnostic) daylight. As we have seen, memoirists often point to a mystery and 
unknowability inherent in madness. Its extremity, its antinomic relation with 
reason and linearity, its generation of both insight and utter despair, its 
inextricable implication in the social, the complex effects of stigma, and, 
moreover, that all this and more is experienced through the very lens of ‘mad’ 
perception, means that a narrative model which only explains, connects, and 
concludes will at best fail to signify its object. 
 Lauren Slater, in her memoir of mental illness, Spasm, directly addresses 
these issues. She claims her account is “passionately dedicated to the truth” 
(Slater, 2000: 160), yet it is subtitled A Memoir With Lies, and she describes it 
as a “slippery, playful, impish, exasperating text, shaped […] like a question 
mark” (ibid: 223). Spasm mixes together fiction with memoir, with its author 
refusing to reveal what is ‘true’ and what ‘false’; it is couched in a poetic and 
postmodern style, in which the ‘end’ of the story occurs in the middle of the 
book, and metanarrative is utilised to usurp any suggestion of a detached or 
transparent view; it includes letters to the reader and the publisher, and extracts 
from medical textbooks. The point of all this is that Slater wants to convey 
narrative (rather than narrowly referential) truth, by using a metaphorical 
(rather than an informational) discourse: “invention”, she claims, can “get to 
the heart of things”, while metaphor can gesture towards “the silence behind 
the story”: “through it we can propel silence into sound” (ibid: 196 & 219-20).4 
 Metaphor, then, or more specifically the literary or poetic narrative, is used 
by Slater, by Wurtzel and Thompson in their novelistic and open texts, and 
also by many other autopathographers (see, for instance: Kaysen, 1995; Burke, 
1995), to point beyond itself to that which cannot be said - the silence behind 
the story. In a similar vein to Slater, the literary theorist Shoshana Felman, 
discussing the representation of trauma, writes of its intrinsic otherness, and 
that authors need to acknowledge that they cannot fully ‘possess’ it. Citing the 
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poets Mallarmé and Celan, she formulates a notion of precocious testimony 
which is, she claims, 
 
the very principle of poetic insight and the very core of the event of poetry which 
makes […] language - through its breathless gasps - speak ahead of its knowledge 
and awareness and break through the limits of its own conscious understanding. 
  (Felman, 1995: 29-30) 
 
“Poetry”, she continues, can “speak beyond its means”; and is thus able to 
testify to a half-known trauma, the repercussions of which, in their 
“uncontrollable and unanticipated nature, still continue to evolve even in the 
very process of the testimony” (ibid: 30). 
 Such an evolving is evident in Slater’s Spasm, and in the memoirs by 
Wurtzel and Thompson. The sense connoted by their shifting and uncertain 
narrative dynamics is that selfhood is still being formulated; the subjectivities 
described, therefore, are not enclosed in the clarity of daylight, but are bound 
up with language, expression, and the negotiation of the temporal. Intrinsic to 
this, and implicit in Kofman’s notion of a writing without power, is that 
narrative in such works allows space for otherness, or that which cannot be 
fully understood and assimilated. In my context here, such an alterity stands for 
that which inheres in the experience of madness but which the biomedical 
narrative cannot account for; and it also allows for the otherness of the self: 
narrative selfhood is connoted not as atomistic and contained, but as something 
labile that cannot be completely known. 
 Finally, it is important to emphasize that a speaking or a narration without 
power is not equivalent to a speaking which eschews agency. Kofman draws 
inspiration from Maurice Blanchot, who writes that a crisis-experience in 
which the sense of ‘I’ is utterly dispersed can only be transformed into 
“salvation” with a restorative reformulation of subjectivity. He asserts that: 
 
there must be restored - beyond this self that I have ceased to be, and within the 
anonymous community - the instance of a Self-Subject […]. 
  (Blanchot, 1993: 134) 
 
Blanchot describes this mode of existence as one which is “no longer […] a 
dominating and oppressive power drawn up against the ‘other’”, but rather is 
that which “can receive the unknown and the foreign, receive them in the 
justice of a true speech” (ibid). But, intrinsic to true speech - and to a writing 
without power - is the reclamation of the ‘I’: if the psychical fragmentation of 
acute distress is to be transformed then a willed occupation of the ground of 
first-person discourse is essential. 
 A writing without power, a true speech, or, as Blanchot also names it, an 
“attention to affliction” (ibid), is an ethical mode of being because it is 
predicated not on a desire for total understanding, but allows for an excess - the 
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unknown and the foreign - which is outside of comprehension, and 
approachable perhaps only via art, via the elliptical, the sidelong, the 
metaphorical. Such a just speaking is particularly germane in my context here, 
because, as that which is outside reason, madness is patterned by the 
movements of ‘otherness’. A just speech could be envisaged as the self 
speaking into, and of, multiplicity and inner storm with a singular voice, 
thereby strengthening a sense of selfhood and agency (see Morin and Everett, 
1990; Davidson and Strauss, 1992), while yet remaining attentive and open to 
the unexpected, the mysterious, to dislocation and uncertainty - rather than 
imposing a rigid conceptual framework on the interior realm. This is, 
potentially, a salutary mode of existence: allowing for the irruptions of 
otherness within speech and writing may help effect a reconciliation with what 
Kristeva names the ‘foreigner’ “within ourselves” (Kristeva, 1991: 1), and 
repudiate stasis and repression in favour of a joy which emerges from 
“perpetual transience” (ibid: 4). Paradoxically, however, such an openness may 
also threaten the self. Allowing the other - in its very distress - to be heard, 
may be to re-experience the roots of the distress and disorder which has 
precisely engendered, or been engendered by, madness. Yet it may only be in 
such a mode of narrative existence that an authentic, and therefore ethical, 
relation with the self - Blanchot’s ‘salvation’ - is possible. 
 
 
Notes 
 
1) I have put these terms in scare quotes because both can, for different 
reasons, be problematic for those who live with acute mental distress. 
 
2) Autopathography: an autobiographical story of illness. 
 
3) The sense of space and time in an artistic work (see Bakhtin, 1981: 234). 
 
4) Cf. George Aichele’s definition of metaphor as "any figure (or trope) of 
language, in which language resists our desire to possess it through a 
single, identical framing of sense and reference; the fundamental 
incompleteness of language" (Aichele, 1985: 143). 
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